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Determinants of Successful Collective Management of Forest Resources: Evidence
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Abstract
Participation of local communities in management and utilization of forest resources
through collective action has become widely accepted as a possible solution to failure
of centralized, top-down approaches to forest conservation. Developing countries have
thus resorted to devolution of forest management through initiatives such as Participa-
tory Forest Management (PFM) and Joint Forest Management (JFM). In Kenya, under
such initiatives, communities have been able to self-organize into community forest as-
sociations (CFAs). However, despite these efforts and an increased number of CFAs,
the results in terms of ecological outcomes have been mixed, with some CFAs failing
and others thriving. Little is known about the factors influencing success of these initia-
tives. Using household-level data from 518 households and community-level data from 22
CFAs from the Mau forest conservancy, the study employed logistic regression, OLS and
heteroscedasticity-based instrumental variable techniques to analyze factors influencing
household participation levels in CFA activities and to further identify the determinants
of successful collective management of forest resources, as well as the link between par-
ticipation level and the success of collective action. The results show that the success
of collective action is associated with the level of household participation in CFA ac-
tivities, distance to the forest resource, institutional quality, group size, and salience of
the resource, among other factors. We also found that collective action is more success-
ful when CFAs are formed through users’ self-motivation with frequent interaction with
government institutions and when the forest cover is low. Factors influencing the level
of household participation are also identified. The study findings point to the need for:
a robust diagnostic approach in devolution of forest management to local communities,
considering diverse socio-economic and ecological settings; government intervention in
reviving and re-institutionalizing existing and infant CFAs in an effort to promote PFM
within the Mau forest and other parts of the country; and intense effort towards design
of a mix of incentive schemes to encourage active and equal household participation in
CFA activities.
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1 Introduction
Forests resources are critical for the provision of ecosystem and environmental services, such as
biodiversity conservation, provisioning of fresh air, carbon sequestration, maintenance of hydro-
logical flows, and renewal of soil fertility (Nagendra et al., 2011). Rural communities around the
world therefore rely on forests, as they significantly contribute to their livelihoods (Shackleton
et al., 2007). Over the years, there has been an alarming decline in forest cover in many devel-
oping countries due to advances in technology, rising human population, poverty, and other social
hardships, leading to over-reliance on forest resources, coupled with increased demand for forest
ecosystem services. This situation fueled the search for new strategies to stem the trend and place
remaining forests under secure and effective management.
Initial efforts aimed at taming the rising degradation of natural resources involved centralized
administration of common pool natural resources such as forests through restrictions on levels
of resource extraction. These efforts were mainly characterized by distrust of locals’ ability to
manage forest resources on which they depend; hence, governments almost fully assumed the role
of managing the forests (Heltberg, 2001). However, high information, enforcement and monitoring
costs reduced the effectiveness of such administrative structures. It is such policy, market and
institutional failures in management of natural resources that led to a policy shift focusing on
how local communities can self-organize and manage natural resources (Gopalakrishnan, 2005).
However, there is still no consensus on the ability of local communities to self-organize (Ostrom,
2009). Neoclassical theory maintains that communities can only self-organize in the presence of
coercion or external force. The gloomy prediction of Hardin (1968) that, unless there is government
intervention or privatization, all commonly managed resources would inevitably end in tragedy
fueled trends encouraging privatization and discouraging collaborative resource management and
had disastrous consequences on welfare and ecological outcomes. Hardin’s prediction also led to an
increase in interest in cooperation as a means to manage the commons (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990;
Tang, 1992). Over time, evidence from case studies in Asian countries have shown that communities
can self-organize and develop robust natural resource management institutions adapted to local
conditions. This motivated scholars to challenge neoclassical economics and Hardin’s tragedy of
the commons theory e.g., Ostrom (2010) through the theory of collective action. The theory is
based on the premise that participants have a stake in the final outcome. Therefore, agreed norms
and customary rules in rural communities are a recipe for successful collective action that can lead
to well preserved and utilized Common Pool Resources1 (CPRs) (Muchara et al., 2014).
Therefore, local community participation in utilization and management of forest resources through
collective action has become widely accepted as a possible solution to the failure of the centralized,
top-down approaches to forest conservation (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). Hence the increased
adoption of PFM in most developing countries (Wily, 2001; Agrawal, 2007).
1According to Ostrom et al. (1994), a CPR is a defined as a resource from which it is relatively costly to exclude others but the use
of the resource is rivalrous or subtractable in consumption.
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1.1 Participatory Forest Management in Kenya
Kenya’s forest cover of the land area stands at 7%, far below the constitutional requirement
of 10% (GOK, 2015). It is also estimated that about 80% of the Kenyan population are rural
communities dependent on rain-fed subsistence agriculture, supplemented by forest resources for
their livelihoods (FSK, 2006). The five major water towers2 remain of significant importance to
the economy because they supply a range of ecosystem services. In most parts of the country,
the sustainability of these services is threatened or declining with the rising demand for ecosystem
services.
Between 2000 and 2010 alone, it is estimated that about 50,000 hectares were lost as a result of
human-induced deforestation (UNEP, 2012). However, in recognition of the role of local forest-
adjacent communities in reduction of forest destruction and degradation, the Kenyan government
introduced the concept of PFM (MENR, 2005, 2016). This was first entrenched by the enactment
of the Forest Act (2005) and the subsequent National Forest Act (2016)3. Under the PFM arrange-
ment in Kenya, the government retains ownership of the forest while forest-adjacent communities,
organized in the form of Community Forest Associations (CFAs), obtain user rights. The rationale
for promotion of participation of locals in resource management was based on the premise that the
resource can be effectively managed when local resource users benefit from the resource and have
exclusive or shared rights to make decisions in management of the resource. Communities have in
turn been able to form community-based organizations known as CFAs in collaboration with the
Kenya Forest Service (KFS).
1.1.1 Organization of Community Forest Associations
The Forest Act requires forest adjacent-community members to enter into partnership with KFS
through registered CFAs. The partnership applies both to forests owned by local authorities and
those owned by the state (i.e. gazetted, forests). CFAs are registered based on approval by
KFS. Local communities may apply for certain rights in utilization and management of forest
resources through the CFAs so long as the rights are not in conflict with forest conservation
objectives (Mogoi et al., 2012). In the Act, CFAs are recognized as partners in management of
forests and are formed by several Community Based Organizations (CBOs) or Forest User Groups
(FUGs)4. To supplement efforts, commercial plantations are also open to lease arrangements.
In return, communities are entitled to a range of user rights, such as collecting firewood, grass
for roof thatching and grazing animals, herbal medicine, timber and scientific and educational
activities, as well as recreational activities. This is a departure from prior practice, where gazetted
2Mau forest complex, Mt Elgon, Cherengani hills, Mt Kenya, and Abardares Ranges.
3Some of the key features of the Forest Act (2016) are mainstreaming of forest conservation and management into national land
use systems; devolution of community forest conservation and management; deepening community participation in forest management
by strengthening CFAs; implementation of national forest policies and strategies; introduction of benefit sharing arrangements such as
Plantation Establishment and Livelihood Improvement Schemes (PELIS); and adoption of an ecosystem approach to management of
forests.
4A FUG is a group of people with shared rights and duties to access and use products from the forest. FUG members register with
different groups based on their interest, e.g., PELIS, bee-keeping, grazing etc.
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forest reserves were fully managed by the government. As part of benefit sharing arrangements,
PELIS was reintroduced in 2007 through CFAs to promote the livelihood of locals while ensuring
sustainable management and conservation of forests. However, community members are required
to pay some user fees in order to benefit from these resources. A percentage of these fees goes to
the FUGs and CFA, while a bigger percentage goes to KFS. Paid up members are given a receipt
to show they have user rights. Violators may be prosecuted, depending on the magnitude of the
offense; otherwise, smaller offenses are handled at the CFA level.
1.1.2 Motivation of the Study
As of 2009, there was at least one forest association in each forest in Kenya. The number has
increased and by 2011 there was a total of 325 CFAs countrywide, with Mau having 35 CFAs. The
governing structures are the KFS board at the national level and a Forest Conservation Committee
under each forest conservancy in Kenya5, which represents CFAs at the national level, the county
forest board at the county level, and lastly the CFA executive committee or general representative
body. The National Alliance for Community Forests Associations (NACOFA) also represents the
rights of CFAs at the national level. However, these CFAs have had their fair share of challenges,
e.g., mismanagement, disintegration, varying interests and heterogeneity among members causing
more conflicts (Ongugo et al., 2008). In addition to these challenges, the Mau forest attracts a lot
of political interest and is very prone to ethnic tensions, hence the CFAs may often be destabilized
during election periods. During the fieldwork for this study, a number of CFA officials complained
of the rent-seeking behavior of most foresters. The main complaint was that the foresters who
should be the representative of the government at the devolved level were the main agents of
forest degradation, as they colluded with loggers or CFA officials to harvest more than the licensed
number of trees or even indigenous trees that are to be preserved, despite intense efforts by CFAs
to conserve the forest resource. Moreover, forest degradation has continued despite the existing
incentives aimed at deepening community participation and conserving forests and despite the
increased number of CFAs countrywide. Most of the CFAs have also remained disorganized and
some are driven by selfish interests without conservation objectives (Ongugo et al., 2008). The
existing CFAs have also yielded varying levels of success in terms of ecological outcomes. The
mixed levels of success from the CFAs is a clear indication that PFM cannot be assumed as a
blueprint for successful collective action or be treated as a one size fits all solution. A point of
concern is why some CFAs succeed while others fail. There could be other context-specific factors
influencing people’s participation levels that are worth considering in analyzing the success or
failure of collective action in managing CPRs. There is also little understanding of the factors
behind the varying levels of success of these CFAs. In addition, policy makers need to understand
how to incentivize household participation and roll out devolution of forest management to local
communities.
5The forest conservancies in Kenya are Central Highlands, Nairobi, Eastern, North Eastern, Ewaso North, Coast, Mau, North Rift,
Western, and Nyanza.
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In light of socio-economic and demographic pressure, the sustainability of forest management
requires successful coordination and cooperation among users, hence requiring an understanding
of the determinants of successful collective action (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). For instance,
what factors influence households’ level of participation in CFA activities? Does the level of
household participation in CFA activities matter for the success of collective action? To the best
of our knowledge, no empirical study has tried to determine the drivers of successful collective
action within the Mau forest, especially within the context of indigenous communities reliant on
agriculture and with a history of constant displacement from their land due to ethnic conflicts
and government actions. Mixed results have also been obtained on the determinants of household
levels of participation in community forest management (see Baral 1993; Malla 1997; Agrawal
2000; Adhikari 2004; Fujiie et al. 2005; Maskey et al. 2006; Jumbe and Angelsen 2007; Coulibaly-
Lingani et al. 2011; Jana et al. 2014; Ali et al. 2015). Moreover, most of the studies on drivers of
successful collective action have been based on intensive case studies of individual CPRs (Fujiie
et al., 2005). These scholars have used various methods to identify and examine determinants of
collective action. Some studies have been based on socio-anthropological case studies (e.g., Wade,
1988; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994), while some have employed game theory models (see
Baland and Platteau 1996; Lise 2005). Based on a number of case studies, Wade (1988), Ostrom
(1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), Agrawal (2001) and Gautam and Shivakoti (2005) represent
some of the significant analysis of conditions necessary for successful collective action. More recent
literature in support of these scholars includes Cox (2014), Frey and Rusch (2014), Rasch et al.
(2016a), Rasch et al. (2016b) and Behnke et al. (2016). Ostrom also developed a framework
for organizing variables identified as affecting the interaction patterns and observed outcomes in
empirical studies of Social Ecological Systems (SESs) (see Ostrom 2009, 2010)6.
An overview of this literature further suggests the lack of consensus on what determines the
success or failure of local institutions in management of CPRs and also suggests that there is no
universal set of conditions. For instance, Agrawal (2001), using Indian case studies, identified
35 such criteria. However, identifying the determinants of successful collective action needs to
move beyond pilot projects and case studies that have formed the basis of most studies to date.
There are also considerable differences in applied definitions, especially considering the variation
in variables employed and their measurement, contextual factors, and methodological approaches,
hence making comparison difficult. These studies have also been more biased towards Asian case
studies. Most of these studies also tend to incorrectly specify the nature of collective action
problems (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004), resulting in measurement error problems. For example, an
index of collective action is constructed to capture community involvement in collective action.
Others have also measured forest conditions using an index of respondents’ rankings of the forest
condition or subjective assessment by foresters or experts and local communities, whereas others
use number of wildlife, reduction in land degradation, time to collect firewood, measures of wealth,
investment in forest, and perceptions of forest condition (see Heltberg et al., 2000; Gibson et al.,
6The framework has also been applied in other spheres e.g., communal livestock production (see Rasch et al. 2016a,b).
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2005; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Behera,
2009; Andersson and Agrawal, 2011; Coleman and Fleischman, 2012; Dash and Behera, 2012).
These approaches are rather subjective. Once communities have collectively organized, the main
interest should be in objective measures of outcome of such collective action, i.e., whether there
is an increase in forest cover that can guarantee efficient and sustainable provision of ecosystem
services as per the government’s key policy goal. Lastly, a common practice in these studies is
the small sample size problem, especially at the institutional level. The different models of PFM
also warrant a context-specific study. This study therefore seeks to fill these gaps by identifying
the factors influencing households’ level of participation in CFA activities and identifying the
determinants of successful collective management of forest resources by CFAs as we examine the
link between successful collective action and level of household participation in CFA activities,
using the Mau forest conservancy in Kenya as a case study as we apply Ostrom’s SESs framework.
The study contributes to literature on collective action and the ongoing debate on the universal
applicability of devolution of forest management as a solution to environmental degradation under
different socio-economic, cultural and ecological settings, through empirical validation of the theo-
retical views in the commons literature. We contribute to this literature in a number of ways: first,
we do not rely on subjective assessment of forest condition as a measure of outcomes of collective
action, as employed by most studies, but instead use two objective outcome measures namely, per-
centage forest cover within each CFA and reported cases of vandalism7 within each CFA in a year.
Second, we conduct analysis at the CFA level but factor in all households sampled in these CFAs
to handle the potential sample size problem. Third, we include potential intervening institutional
and household-level variables that have not been employed in other studies as we try to tease out
the drivers of successful collective action. To assess the consistency of our estimates and ascertain
the reliability of our results, we compare the results with a composite index of collective action
that has been employed in past studies. An overview of the findings reveals that CFAs tend to
be more successful with higher levels of household participation, when initiated by the commu-
nities themselves, and with frequent interaction with government institutions at the national and
devolved levels. We also find that communities tend to self-organize more when the forest cover is
low and less when there is abundant supply of forest resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a description of the study area;
Section 3 outlines the methodological framework; Section 4 presents the data collection and sam-
pling method; Section 5 presents the results and discussions and Section 6 presents conclusions
and policy recommendations.
7We define forest vandalism as any illegal activity that is aimed at destroying existing forest resources e.g., fires, illegal logging and
logging of indigenous trees that should be protected, illegal harvesting of firewood, etc.
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2 Description of the study site
The study was conducted in the Mau forest conservancy. The Mau forest provides a range of
ecosystem services and supports significant population in terms of livelihood needs. The choice of
the Mau forest was based on two criteria: high susceptibility to degradation and a long history
of community forestry, with the highest number of CFAs of any forest in Kenya, i.e., 35. The 35
CFAs are evenly spread across the entire Mau forest complex, each with different levels of forest
cover and with high levels of biodiversity. Thus, the site may provide key lessons and best practices
for promotion of participatory forest management across the country. It is also the largest closed
canopy forest among the five major Water Towers in Kenya and has lost over a quarter of its forest
resources in the last decade (Force, 2009). The forest is located at 0°30’ South, 35°20’ East within
the Rift Valley Province. It originally covered 452, 007 ha but, after the 2001 forest excisions, the
current estimated size is about 416, 542 ha. The Mau conservancy is made up of 22 forest blocks8,
of which 21 are gazetted forests managed by KFS. The remainder is Mau Trust Land Forest (46,
278 ha), which is managed by the Narok County Council (NEMA, 2013). A picture of the Mau
forest complex is presented in Figure 1.
The Mau ecosystem is also the upper catchment of many major rivers9, as depicted in Figure
1. These rivers feed into various lakes, e.g., Nakuru, Baringo, Natron, Naivasha, Turkana and
Victoria. The lakes and rivers also provide much-needed water for pastoral communities and
agricultural activity and supply essential ecosystem services such as micro climate regulation,
water purification, water storage and flood mitigation. In addition, the hydro-power potential of
the Mau forest is estimated to be about 535 MW, which equals about 47% of the total installed
electric power generation capacity in Kenya (UNEP, 2008). Apart from provision of local public
goods such as food, herbs, and wood-fuel, the forest also supplies global public goods and services
e.g., wildlife habitat, carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. The upper catchment of
the forest also hosts the last groups of hunter-gatherer communities in Kenya, such as the Ogiek
(Force, 2009).
8South Molo, Transmara, Eastern Mau, Mt. Londiani, Maasai Mau, Ol Pusimoru, Mau Narok, Western Mau, South West Mau,
Eburu and Molo. In the north are Tinderet, Timboroa, Northern Tinderet, Kilombe Hill, Metkei, Nabkoi, Lembus, Maji Mazuri, and
Chemorogok forests.
9Including the Yala, Nzoia, Nyando, Mara, Sondu, Kerio, Ewaso Ngiro, Molo, Njoro, Nderit, Naishi and Makalia rivers.
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Figure 1: Mau Forest Complex Map
3 Methodology
This section highlights the conceptual framework of the study, definitions and measurement of
variables, the analytical framework and the estimation model.
3.1 Conceptual framework
In this study, we employ the framework of Ostrom (2009) for analyzing Social-Ecological Systems
(SESs), depicted in Figure 2. In the framework, eight broad variables that affect the sustainability
of SES and ability to self-organize are identified. The framework analyses how attributes of resource
units, the resource system, users of the system and the governance system jointly affect and are
indirectly affected by interactions and resulting outcomes achieved at a particular time and place.
We also make use of structural variables that may affect the likelihood of collective action as
identified in Ostrom (2010).
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Figure 2: A Framework for Analyzing a Social-Ecological System
Adapted from Elinor Ostrom (2009)
Figure 2 shows the relationship among the first four level of core subsystems of a SES, which affect
each other and the linked economic, political and social systems and related ecosystems. The four
core subsystems consist of the resource system (specified forest reserve), resource unit (trees, plants
and shrubs, in the forest), governance system (KFS, CFAs, county and other NGOs) and users
(individual households or communities who use the forest). Our task is therefore to empirically
explore which factors are important for successful collective action in forest management. The
SES framework is also decomposable, i.e., each of the highest tier conceptual variables in Figure
2 can be decomposed into several tiers depending on the research problem. A detailed exposition
of the second-tier variables in Figure 2, as per Ostrom’s framework, is found in Ostrom (2009).
From the literature, including the SES framework, a long list of potential determinants of successful
collective action have been suggested by different authors (see Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990; Baland and
Platteau 1996; Agrawal 2001; Tesfaye et al. 2012; Akamani and Hall 2015; Hyde 2016). However,
due to sample size and insufficient variation across CFAs, we cannot include all the variables in
the regression. We therefore concentrate on some of the key variables whose significance has been
highlighted in most recent theoretical and empirical literature, as well as some intervening variables
at household and community level. The second-tire variables from the SES framework employed in
the study are presented in Table 1. The table presents the grouping of the variables we employed
in the empirical models. A clear description of these variables, how they are measured and the
expected signs is presented in Table 2.
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Table 1: Second Tier Variables Used in the Study
In addition to some of the variables identified in the literature, we factored in an index of insti-
tutional quality, capturing the level of implementation of Ostrom’s design principles10; because
the design principles are orthogonal to each other, a simple summation is sufficient to generate a
sufficient index of institutional quality. Other indices captured are an incentive index capturing
the number of incentives from which CFAs benefit, an index of dependence on the forest and an
index of forest improvement, capturing the level of forest maintenance activities or collective ac-
tion activities. Because face-to-face bargaining between communities and the regional or national
government is important for the success of collective action, we considered factors such the num-
ber of meetings between CFA and county/local authorities, to capture horizontal interaction, and
number of meetings between CFA and KFS headquarters, for vertical interaction.
10The design principles are namely: Clearly and well defined boundaries and membership; proportional equivalence between benefits
and costs i.e., appropriation rules for availability of resources; collective choice arrangements i.e. those affected by the operational rules
are included in the group and can modify these rules; monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; scale of graduated sanctions i.e., those
who violate rules receive graduated sanctions; conflict resolution mechanisms; minimal recognition of rights to organize i.e., the rights
of users are not challenged by external authorities; and organization in the form of nested enterprises (Ostrom, 1993).
9
3.2 Analytical framework
Econometric modelling techniques are applied to investigate factors influencing households’ level of
participation in CFA activities and the determinants of successful collective management of forest
resources. Two estimation models are used. In the first stage, we estimate a standard logit model
(see Wooldridge, 2010) for the level of participation (active participation=1 and 0 otherwise) to
identify factors influencing households’ level of participation in CFA activities. We then compute
the predicted probability of active participation and denote this by CFAPartHt, for use in the
second stage regressions as one of the explanatory variables in identifying the determinants of
successful collective action.
3.2.1 Determinants of successful collective management of forest resources
In the second stage, we employed multiple OLS regression models to estimate the determinants of
successful collective action, factoring in the predicted probability of active participation in CFA
activities (CFAPartHt). We measure success of collective action within each CFA using percentage
forest cover and annual number of reported cases of vandalism11. The study is based on the premise
that the expected percentage forest cover and reported cases of vandalism under each CFA can
be associated with household characteristics and CFA level characteristics (including the resource
characteristics, system of governance, group characteristics and interactions, etc.). For the reported
cases of vandalism, despite the count nature of the data, we used the OLS regression instead of
the Tobit model because the Tobit model may not yield small standard errors compared to the
OLS model with robust standard errors. The Tobit model12 is also more vulnerable to violation
of the assumptions of the error distribution, and, hence, may produce seriously biased coefficients
(Madigan (2007) cited in Araral (2009)). We define the OLS regression model as
Yj = β0 + β1CFAPartHtij + β2Xij + β3Zj + εij (1)
where Yj is a vector of two dependent variables, namely percentage forest cover and reported
cases of vandalism in CFA j, CFAPartHtij is the predicted probability of a household i actively
participating in CFA j activities, Xij is a vector of household i in CFA j characteristics, Zj is a
vector of CFA j characteristics and εijis a random disturbance term. A description of the CFA
and household-level variables and the expected signs are as shown in Table 2.
11We acknowledge that the percentage change in forest cover would be an ideal measure of success as opposed to the aggregate
percentage forest cover as employed in this study. However, due to lack of baseline information on forest cover at the start of devolution
of forest management for most CFAs, we opted to use the aggregate measure of forest cover but also assess the reliability and consistency
of the estimates using the reported cases of vandalism per year. It is also important to note that, before devolution of forest management
to CFAs, the Mau forest had been highly degraded. Therefore, the aggregate percentage forest cover can still be attributed to the actions
of forest-adjacent communities through CFAs. This implies that the aggregate forest cover can still provide meaningful insights on the
determinants of successful collective action.
12Some studies have also used the Poisson regression or the negative binomial regression in cases of count data like the reported cases
of vandalism. We do not apply these methods because there is no serious problem of over-dispersion.
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Table 2: Description of variables included in the econometric analysis and expected signs
Expected signs
variable Definition Forest cover Vandalism
Numbhsehlds Number of households in CFA jurisdiction (Group Size) - +
CFAParticipation Dummy equal 1 if household active in CFA and 0 otherwise + -
GrpStructure Dummy equal 1 if the group structure is same as it was constituted and 0 otherwise + -
Natives Percentage of CFA members who are locals/natives +/- +/-
FBudget Total CFA financial budget per year + -
ECMale No of males in the executive committee or general representative body in the CFA +/- +/-
VertInt Number of Meetings between CFA members and KFS national office + -
HorInt Number of meetings between CFA and regional government i.e. county/local authority + -
GradChair Dummy=1 if chair of CFA has post-secondary education(graduate) 0 otherwise + -
Competition1 Dummy=1 if there has been competition for any position and 0 otherwise + -
SocInt Household density per hectare of the CFA jurisdiction-proxy for social interaction + -
MaritSta Dummy =1 if household head is married and 0 otherwise
MedAge Age of household head +/- +/-
Education dummy =1 if household head has post primary education and 0 otherwise
hhsize Household size +/- +/-
LivesVal Total value of household livestock - +
Employment Dummy =1 if household head is employed in off-farm jobs and 0 otherwise
Woodlots dummy=1 if household owns private woodlot and zero otherwise
Hlandsize Household land size in acres
LandTitle Dummy=1 If household owns land title for the land it occupies and 0 otherwise + -
DistForest Distance in kilometres from household to the nearest edge of the forest - +
DistMroad Distance in kilometres from household to the nearest main road
DistMarket Distance in kilometres from household to the nearest market/urban centre
ResidStatus Dummy =1 if household head is a native and 0 if immigrant/settler + -
MedIncome Household income from all sources +/- +/-
IncentIndex Index of incentives household benefit from within CFA (ranging from 0 to 11)
InstIndex Index of level of implementation of Ostrom design principles (ranging from 0 to 10) + -
ImprIndex Index of forest improvement activities (e.g., silviculture, pruning etc) (0-6) + +/-
DepIndex Index of level of dependence on forest resources within CFA - +
Precipitation Average annual precipitation (mm) + +/-
Temperature Annual average temperature in degrees celsius - +
Elevation1 Level of elevation in each forest (metres) - +
However, although we do not expect our data to exhibit endogeneity, we posit that the quality
of institutions, as measured by the level of implementation of Ostrom design principles, could be
potentially endogenous to our two measures of success of collective action, i.e., percentage forest
cover and reported cases of vandalism. There is some reverse causality, with the possibility that,
the more CFAs become organized, i.e., as the index of institutional quality increases, the higher
the forest cover and the fewer cases of vandalism; conversely, as the forest cover increases and there
are fewer reported cases of vandalism, there is less incentive for enforcing the design principles due
to the abundant supply of the resource. This is also supported by the theory that resource scarcity
translates into more self-organization of institutions (Ostrom, 1990). We therefore proceed by first
estimating an OLS model, assuming absence of endogeneity, then enrich the empirical analysis by
employing instrumental variables estimation with heteroscedasticity-based instruments following
Lewbel (2012) to test and address the potential endogeneity. The main advantage of this approach
is that it provides options for generating instruments and allows the identification of structural
parameters in models with endogeneity or mis-measured regressors when we do not have external
instruments. The approach is also capable of supplementing weak instruments. Identification is
consequently achieved by having explanatory variables that are uncorrelated with the product of
heteroscedastic errors (see Lewbel (2012)).
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For robustness checks, we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct a composite
index of success or failure in organizing collective action. The PC score was constructed using one
dominant collective action activity reported by CFAs: forest management/improvement activities.
The activities under forest management/improvement involved pruning, enrichment planting, re-
seeding, weeding, silviculture activities, thinning and watering. Household participation in each
collective action activity is recorded as one and non-participation as zero. The PC score was then
employed in an OLS regression model to assess the robustness of our results for the determinants
of successful collective management of forest resources under OLS and IV estimation models. The
use of the PC score also helps us determine whether there is any variation (i.e., in terms of statis-
tical significance and consistency of effects in both models) when we use measures of outcome or
just a measure of collective action, as in past studies.
4 Data collection and sampling method
The survey was conducted in two phases. First, a pilot survey was conducted in Londiani CFA
of Kericho county to test the validity and construction of the survey instrument. The survey
instrument was then modified based on preliminary findings. In the final survey, a two-stage
sampling procedure was employed in data collection. In the first stage, a sample of 22 out of 35
CFAs were purposively identified to reflect the entire Mau forest, with the help of the head of
the Mau forest conservancy13. The CFAs covered five counties of Bomet, Narok, Kericho, Nakuru
and Uasin Gishu. The CFAs were a representation of the entire Mau forest. They also provide
variation by regions, especially in terms of geographical and climatic variables. It is also important
to note that the CFAs are very different in several aspects and have different levels of performance
in terms of forest conservation, with some having as low as 2% forest cover and the highest having
98% forest cover.
The CFA level data were collected through focus group discussions with CFA officials and other
members at their offices in the forest station. In the second stage, a sample of 518 households were
identified through simple random sampling, in which every third household was interviewed, and
snowballing was used in instances where the third household was not a CFA member14. This was
conducted using individual household-level survey administered questionnaire to household heads.
The CFA-level focus group provided CFA-level data such as years of existence of the CFA, gender
composition of the CFA executive committee, number of households within the CFA, number of
immigrants etc. The household-level data provided information such as household size, household
level of participation in CFA activities (whether active or not), household head education level,
residential status, and distance to the nearest edge of the forest, main road and market. Due to
13One observation raised by a reviewer was that the head of the conservancy could have identified CFAs that performed well, hence
raising issues about the generalizability of the results. However, we can confirm that this was not the case since we visited CFAs that
were in poor condition. The main factor considered by the head was accessibility of these CFAs and representation of all counties in
the Mau forest. The results can therefore be generalized for the entire Mau forest.
14In some instances, we interviewed CFA members at the farms in the forest or when there were collective activities such as tree
planting or transportation of tree seedlings
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the nature of the terrain and inaccessibility of certain areas, coupled with negative attitudes of
some CFA members as a result of mismanagement of CFAs by officials, the households sampled
were unevenly distributed across the CFAs, with as few as four households sampled in some cases.
Because of the variation in climatic and geographical conditions and the vastness in the sizes of
the CFAs, we also collected data on annual average rainfall and temperature values for the various
forests. This data was available from the website (http://en.climate-data.org/country/124/). Most
of the explanatory variables were based on the decomposed second-tier variables in Table 1 from
Ostrom (2009), Ostrom (2010) and Agrawal (2001).
To gauge the household head’s level of participation in CFA activities, respondents were assessed
based on the last meeting they attended15, that is, whether they were just present during decision
making (nominal), merely attended, were present when a decision was made and were informed but
did not speak (passive), expressed an opinion whether sought or not (active), or felt she influenced
the decision (interactive)16.
In this study, two measures of outcomes of collective action were used: reported cases of vandalism
in a year and forest cover as a percentage of total forest area within each CFA. The choice of these
measures is based on the premise that, if CFAs are well organized, with formal or informal rules
of forest management, which are in use and properly implemented, then there should be behavior
change; hence, we expect changes in forest condition and patterns of forest use. Moreover, the
better a CFA is organized, the higher the likelihood of active participation of households in CFA
activities, with an expected outcome of improvement in forest cover and fewer cases of vandalism.
The reported cases of vandalism and percentage forest cover are based on secondary data available
at the forest station, which is regularly updated by the forester at each forest station. The expected
signs and description of variables employed in this study are shown in Table 2.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of variables used in the econometric models are presented in Table 4 in the
appendix. The table reveals significant variation in percentage forest cover, ranging from 2% to
98%, and reported cases of vandalism ranging from 0 to 120 per year. About 63% of the sampled
households were reportedly active in CFA activities. There was also significant variation in the
number of households among the 22 CFAs sampled, ranging from 100 to 100,000 households in some
CFAs. The reported mean number of households was estimated at about 10,081 households. In
terms of organizational structure, about 49% of the CFAs reported having had the same leadership
structure from inception to date. The mean annual budget of CFAs is approximately USD 3000,
15We used participation in the last meeting attended as a proxy for their participation level because it is difficult for anyone to say
he did not actively participate. However, we cannot rule out possibility of bias, in that some members may talk more in meetings but
not work very much.
16Households were then classified as active (i.e., active or interactive) and inactive (i.e., nominal or passive).
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with the maximum about USD 0.015 million. The summary statistics of other variables employed in
the study are also shown. Further summary statistics of other variables within CFAs are presented
in Tables 6 to 12 in the appendix.
5.2 Logistic regression Results
The logistic regression results are presented in Table 3. Finding no evidence of misspecification or
omitted variable bias, the estimated coefficients in the logistic regression have the expected signs.
The results show that, all factors constant, households where the head has post-primary education
tend to have higher likelihood of actively participating in CFA activities. This is unexpected given
that education results in out-migration and increased opportunity cost of labour (Godoy et al.,
1997). However, this could be explained by the fact that the educated often tend to be informed
and hence recognize and appreciate the value of environmental conservation. They are also more
likely to inform decision making in CFAs because they are the most respected and are listened to
by community members.
Household heads employed in off-farm jobs are less likely to be active in CFA activities. This could
be due to availability of exit options from farm work and other informal jobs. Participation in
CFA could also be a last resort for the unemployed because their returns on labour efforts could
be lower (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). These results support findings by (Fujiie et al., 2005;
Bardhan, 2000). Households owning private woodlots were found to have a significantly higher
likelihood of being actively involved in CFA activities. The ownership of private woodlots would
imply interest in environmental conservation activities or a search for options other than farming,
say, in the forest, after engaging private land in developing private forests17. The results also show
that a one-kilometre increase in distance from the nearest main road increases the likelihood of
being actively involved in CFA activities by approximately 2.2%, holding other factors constant.
In this case, distance measures the level of infrastructure integration; therefore, households would
opt for being active in CFA activities to enjoy the benefits as CFA members, given that accessing
other areas and markets could be costly; hence participation in CFA activities offers a fall-back
option. These findings also lend support to the work of Fujiie et al. (2005), who found that, when
communities are less exposed to urban centres, there is higher incentive for cooperation and hence
active participation.
17During the survey, households mentioned that tree growing offered a lot of income compared to private farming, hence some
households would consider engaging in planting of trees on their farms for income generation and opt to be active in CFA activities to
derive other benefits. e.g. PELIS.
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Table 3: Results for Logistic Regression for Probability of Active Participation in CFA Activities
(1) (2)






























Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
On the other hand, one unexpected result is that of distance to the nearest market. The results
show that a one-kilometre increase in distance from the household to the nearest market reduces the
likelihood of active participation in CFA activities by about 1.6%, holding other factors constant.
This contradicts findings by Fujiie et al. (2005), who found that market access often reduces
interdependence within a local community and thus may allow exit of some members, which might
lower the likelihood of participation in collective action. Our findings also contradict Bardhan
(1993) and Ostrom and Gardner (1993), who found that anonymity among actors increases the
closer households are to markets, which loosens up traditional ties, lessens mutual dependencies
and lowers inter-linkages for punishment in case of violation of rules resulting in reduced prospects
for active involvement and cooperation. However, a possible reason for this finding is that, when
households are closer to market centres, it means they are closer to forest authorities and hence
more likely to be active; we were informed that foresters are normally keen to notice those who have
been active in CFAs, for instance, during transportation of seedlings to the forest and would often
ensure they get PELIS plots as a reward for being active. Lastly, more rainfall prospects increases
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the likelihood of households actively participating in CFA activities. This could be because more
rainfall would mean more anticipated agricultural harvest; hence, more members will tend to be
active in CFA activities to access PELIS plots or derive other non-timber forest products such as
firewood for cooking and keeping warm during the rainy season.
5.3 Regression Model Results
Empirical results for the multiple regression models are presented in Table 5 in the appendix.
We first present the OLS regression estimates assuming absence of endogeneity, then present the
instrumental variable estimation with heteroscedasticity-based instruments to address the potential
endogeneity issues. Columns 1 and 2 present the OLS model of forest cover and reported cases
of vandalism respectively, assuming absence of endogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) present the IV
estimation with heteroscedasticity-based instruments to address the endogeneity concerns. The last
column, Column (5), presents the OLS estimates for the PC score. We tested for multicollinearity
for all the regression models and found all variables to have a variance inflation factor (VIF) below
10, with a mean VIF of between 5.99 and 6.6318. To correct for heteroscedasticity in the models,
we estimated the three models with clustered robust standard errors19. The IV estimates were
obtained using the ivreg2h stata command (Baum et al., 2015).
We first tested for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity under the
null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous (see Table 14 in the appendix). The test rejects
the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 1% significance level for the second IV model of reported
cases of vandalism but not the first IV model where the dependent variable is forest cover. This
suggests that OLS estimates yield better results in model one of forest cover (Column (1)), while
the IV method with heteroscedasticity-based instruments yield better results in the second model,
where the dependent variable is reported cases of vandalism (Column (4)). We further carried out
performance statistics for the IV models (see Table 15). First, we tested for under-identification
(i.e., whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors). Based
on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, we reject the null hypothesis that the equations are
under-identified in the two IV models, at the 1% significance level. Secondly, we tested for weak
identification because, if excluded instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regres-
sors, then the instrument may lead to poor estimates. Using the Craig-Donald Wald F statistic,
we reject the null hypothesis of weak identification, as shown by the large F statistic.
Lastly, we carried out a test of over-identification using the Hansen J statistic under the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e., that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation).
18Other variables such as age of CFA were dropped due to multicollinearity issues.
19It is important to note that, because reported cases of vandalism are count data, other models such as negative binomial and Poisson
regression could be explored. Though the results are not presented here, we found that the Poisson regression was less appropriate
than the negative binomial regression. However, the negative binomial regression results produced results almost identical to results to
the IV model with heteroscedasticity-based instruments. Hence, we settled on the IV model with heteroscedasticity-based instruments
because it addresses the endogeneity problem.
16
Based on this test, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. This result raises
questions about the validity of the IV estimates. It is important to note, however, that the Hansen
J statistic checks the validity of the over-identifying restriction. Our results imply that the validity
of over-identifying restrictions provides limited information on the ability of the instruments to
identify the parameter of interest. This is, however, not a finite sample limitation of the test but
just one of the intrinsic characteristics (Parente and Silva, 2012). According to Parente and Silva
(2012), the outcome of the test of over-identifying restriction does not rely on having a reasonable
number of valid instruments but rather the test checks the coherence of the instrument and not
the validity of the instrument. Therefore, we can still make inferences based on the instrumental
variable estimates of the second IV model. Recall that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity
revealed that the OLS model for forest cover (reported in Column (1)) provides better estimates
than the IV model for forest cover, while the IV estimates for the reported cases of vandalism
(reported in Column (4)) were superior to the OLS model for reported cases of vandalism. Our
discussion will henceforth be focused on the results in Columns (1) and (4).
5.3.1 Institutional organization and governance system
Using the level of implementation of Ostrom’s design principles to assess institutional quality
or level of organization, our results suggest that, holding all factors constant, as the index of
institutional quality increases from zero to ten, there is a higher likelihood of successful collective
action, as depicted by the increase in percentage forest cover. This supports findings by most
studies (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Heltberg et al. 2000; Heltberg 2001; Johnson
and Nelson 2004; Gautam and Shivakoti 2005; Pagdee et al. 2006; Dash and Behera 2015). However,
the positive association of the institutional index and reported cases of vandalism suggest otherwise.
This finding is hard to explain given that it is highly significant, contradicting findings by Alló
and Loureiro (2016) and other past studies. However, according to Alló and Loureiro (2016), it
is important to understand the social aspects of the community to explain the possible positive
association, because some vandalism may be intentional within certain communities, especially
where communities are not satisfied with actions of their officials.
Consistent with theory, we found that organizations initiated by NGOs and national or regional
governments are less likely to lead to successful collective action. Our findings suggest that CFAs
initiated by local communities themselves tend to be successful in collective action. This also
reveals that communities generally mistrust the government and hence are less to likely self-organize
in respect to directives from government, due to fear of the government’s intentions. This finding
could also be attributed to foresters’ rent-seeking behavior and their wanton interference in the
affairs of CFAs. These results are consistent with findings by Gebremedhin et al. (2004) and
(Measham and Lumbasi, 2013).
When it comes to the composition of the CFA executive committee, the results indicate that the
higher the percentage of male executives, the lower the likelihood of successful collective action,
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as shown by the increase in cases of vandalism. These results are consistent with Agrawal and
Chhatre (2006), who found that having more women in power leads to better forest outcomes.
We also considered the frequency of interaction between the CFAs and local/regional government
(horizontal interaction) and national government offices (vertical interaction) with the CFAs and
how this affects the success of collective action. The results show that, the greater the interac-
tion between CFA members and the national or regional governments, the greater the success of
collective action, as depicted by the reduced cases of vandalism20. This suggests that face-to-face
bargaining/interaction and frequent contact with CFA members encourage communities to work
collectively in managing and conserving the natural resources adjacent to them, apparently by in-
creasing trust between forest-adjacent communities and the state. This also implies that frequent
government and community interactions can improve the success of collective action. These results
lend support to findings by Ostrom (2000) and Liu and Ravenscroft (2016).
The study results suggest that financial empowerment of CFAs is an incentive for successful collec-
tive action, as depicted by the growth in forest cover and a decline in reported cases of vandalism.
This is expected given that, with more funding, CFAs can offer compensation to incentivize some
members of the community to guard the forests, or can even hire forest guards. From the survey,
we observed that CFAs with limited financial resources faced problems of forest degradation. How-
ever, we also noted that some CFAs with high income generating activities, such as eco-tourism,
experienced mismanagement of funds and hence degradation of forests by disgruntled members
who felt the CFA officials were mismanaging their resources. This implies that, as much as finan-
cial resources may increase the success of collective action, it may have an opposite effect if not
properly managed, or if there is inequitable distribution.
In terms of the organizational structure, we asked respondents during the focus group discussion
whether the structure of the organization was still the same as when it was first constituted, in
terms of the officials. This was used to assess the effect of trust and group structure on the
success of collective action. Our results show that organizations that had not changed their group
structure or where the structure does not change regularly were more successful in collective
action. That is, in organizations where group members trust and have faith in the group structure
in terms of its officials, then collective action is more likely to be successful. Similarly, to assess
the level of democracy in the group and its effect on the success of collective action, CFA members
and officials were asked during the focus group discussions whether the positions in the CFA are
normally competed for in an election. The study results revealed that democracy leads to successful
collective action. This is expected, given that communities will only have faith in working together
if they perceive the organization to be democratic and they have a say in who leads the group;
otherwise, they might opt to sabotage the group by participating in illegal activities.
20We did not include the frequency of interaction in the two OLS models of forest cover due to multicollinearity.
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5.3.2 Household/User Characteristics
Looking at the regression results in Columns (1) and (4), the results show that, holding all else
constant, the higher the likelihood of active household participation in CFA activities, the greater
the success in collective action. This is expected, given that, with active involvement in CFA
activities, communities are more likely to work collectively towards forest conservation, leading to
better ecological outcomes.When we look at the effect of income heterogeneity, the results indicate
that greater income inequality is detrimental to the success of collective action, in tandem with
findings by Agrawal and Gibson (1999), Andersson and Agrawal (2011) and Tesfaye et al. (2012).
On the other hand, we found that, for sustainability of forest conservation, allocation of property
rights, especially land titles or allotment letters, is critical for successful collective action21.
As expected, the study results suggest that the success of collective action increases with people’s
age. The relationship between forest cover and age is U shaped, while it is an inverted U shape
for age and reported cases of vandalism. These results suggest that forest cover decreases and
reported cases of vandalism increase up to a certain age, when forest cover begins to rise and
reported cases of vandalism begin to decrease. This is because, as people get older, they have less
physical energy to engage in intense economic activities such as forest clearing for farming or illegal
logging activities. Similarly, as people get old, children move away in search of new opportunities
and start their own households; there is less available labour but also fewer mouths to feed, and,
therefore, less dependence on forests as a source of livelihood. These results support findings by
Godoy et al. (1997), although differing with Thondhlana and Shackleton (2015), who argued that
the old often have more ecological knowledge regarding maximal harvest of certain resources like
medicinal plants and wild game.
The study also examined how group size affects the success of collective action, using number
of households within the CFA jurisdiction. Our results suggest that the higher the number of
households within the CFA, the lower the success of collective action, as indicated by the increased
cases of vandalism. This can be due to the fact that the marginal private gains to an individual are
more than the marginal social cost of defection of an individual. More households also mean greater
demand and competition for forest products. The study findings are in accord with expectations
in group theory (Olson, 1965; Tang, 1992; Bardhan, 1993; Fujiie et al., 2005; Hyde, 2016) but
contradicts findings by Agrawal and Goyal (2001) and Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002), who argued
that, as the group size increases, the transaction costs of organizing within a group may also
increase; however, the payoff in terms of lower transaction costs between government and groups
also increases as the size increases. On the other hand, using density of household population
as a proxy for intensity of social interaction, our findings revealed that the higher the household
density, the higher the incentive for successful community wide-collective action, as shown by the
positive effect on forest cover and reduced cases of vandalism as expected. This is because, where
21Giving forest adjacent-communities a sense of belonging encourages them to conserve forest resources, unlike the case when they
know they can be displaced by the government at any time.
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people live closely in a common neighborhood or social circles, enforcing rules is much easier and
there is a lower marginal cost of coming together in collective action. These results are in tandem
with findings by Fujiie et al. (2005) and Akamani and Hall (2015).
Our results also revealed that CFAs with a higher proportion of natives tend to be more successful
in collective action, as revealed by the decline in reported cases of vandalism. This can be explained
by the fact that immigrants may be driven by the motive of extracting forest resources for their
short-term gains rather than conserving the forest, because they have their own homes to go back
to, in the event the resource gets depleted. In general, there is a good deal of ethnic tension
between natives and immigrants within the Mau forest22.
5.3.3 Resource Characteristics
Using distance from the household in kilometres to the nearest edge of the forest to proxy for
resource scarcity, the results suggest that the farther a household is from the nearest edge of the
forest, the lower the success of collective action, as depicted by the decrease in forest cover and
increased cases of vandalism. These results are as expected, given that the farther households are
from the forest, the higher the opportunity costs of participating in CFA activities, hence the lower
likelihood of successful collective action. It is also difficult to monitor forests when households are
far away from the forest, hence the increased cases of reported vandalism.
In the PCA model, we included forest cover to capture forest condition and existence of PELIS
within a CFA to capture the effect of incentives on collective action23. The results suggest that
greater forest cover reduces the likelihood of successful collective action. This is as expected
because, when the forest cover or condition is good, there is an abundant supply of forest ecosystem
services and hence no incentive for communities to self-organize and conserve the forest. Moreover,
when the forest cover is good, people may consider returns from such collective action activities as
low. On the other hand, if the forest condition is bad, there is more incentive to self-organize and
restore the degraded forest due to resource scarcity. Similarly, the existence of incentives such as
PELIS increases the ability of CFAs to self-organize, supporting findings by Szell et al. (2013).
5.3.4 Interaction of the resource with the users
To study the interaction of the resource with forest users, we constructed an additive improvement
index ranging from zero to six to measure the level of improvement activities undertaken by CFAs;
this could also measure cooperation in CFA activities. The study results show that, as the level
of forest improvement activities increases from zero to six, there is significant increase in forest
cover as well as significant decrease in reported cases of vandalism. This means that the more
locals carry out forest improvement activities, such as pruning, the greater the success of collective
22We opted to use data on the proportion of immigrants because we could not get data on in and out migration at CFA level.
23Other variables such as competition, social interaction, group structure, improvement index and initiation of the CFA were dropped
from the model due to multicollinearity
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action, as depicted by both improvement in forest cover and reduced cases of vandalism. This is
attributed to the fact that forest improvement activities increase forest growth and that locals also
monitor the forest during such activities, thereby reducing cases of vandalism.
To assess the effect of the salience of the resource, we constructed an index of resource dependence,
where the index was coded from 0 to 3 with the score ranging from 9 (low dependence) to 21 (very
high dependence). Although studies such as Dietz et al. (2003) and Wade (1988) found that the
level of dependence on a resource is key in facilitating the success of collective action, our results
contradict these studies. We found that the higher the level of dependence on the resource for
livelihood by forest-adjacent communities, the lower the success of collective action, indicated by
the decreased forest cover and increased vandalism. The negative effect on forest cover and positive
effect on reported cases of vandalism can be partly attributed to over-reliance on common pool
resources by forest-adjacent communities due to lack of alternative sources of livelihood.
5.3.5 Robustness Checks
For robustness checks, we considered use of PCA to construct an index of collective action (con-
sidering collective action activities under forest management and improvement) to assess how our
results would vary when we use a measure of collective action as opposed to the outcome of collec-
tive action. Because the seven types of collective action activities under forest management and
improvement may be orthogonal to each other, we used PCA instead of an additive index because
it produces a more effective measure (Darnell, 1994). Further, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)24
measure of sampling adequacy revealed that about five out of the seven variables had a KMO mea-
sure above 0.5, with an overall KMO of 0.49, which justifies the use of PCA. For each collective
action activity, households’ participation in a given CFA is recorded as one and non-participation
as zero. In our sample of 22 CFAs, 75%, 87%, 78%, 81%, 72%, 33% and 29% of them success-
fully organized collective pruning, enrichment planting, reseeding, weeding, silviculture operations,
thinning and watering, respectively.
The PCA results revealed that the first of three components that had eigen values more than one
dominates in terms of eigen values and proportion of variation; see Table 13. Moreover, the first
component also makes more sense economically because none of the coefficients is negative, unlike
the other components. The first component vector contains positive weights for all collective action
variables, which is evidence of aggregate variation as a result of varying degrees of cooperation
(Fujiie et al., 2005). However, this approach does not guarantee that the first component gives
the index of cooperation but just that it is consistent with economic theory (Fujiie et al., 2005).
Following Fujiie et al. (2005), we used the first component as a measure of successful collective
action. We classified CFAs with PC scores greater than zero as successful and those with scores less
than zero as unsuccessful. We then conducted an OLS regression using the constructed measure of
24The KMO measure tests for sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model.
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successful collective action using the PC score25. The results are presented in Column (5) of Table
5. The results do not depict much difference in terms of signs (except for the few insignificant
variables) when we compare with our results using the measures of outcome of collective action.
6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
In this study, we have attempted to analyze factors influencing households’ level of participation
in CFA activities and the determinants of success of collective action in community forest man-
agement, as well as the link between households’ participation levels and the success of collective
action. Using the SES framework for analyzing complex ecological systems, several conclusions
can be made about factors influencing households’ participation levels in community forest man-
agement. The empirical results suggest that employment status, educational level, ownership of
private woodlots, precipitation, and distance to nearest main road and nearest market influence
the household level of participation in community forestry, lending support to the works of (Malla,
1997; Adhikari, 2004; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Maskey et al., 2006; Coulibaly-Lingani et al.,
2011). These factors therefore need adequate consideration in devolving forest management to
local communities in the Mau forest.
The study further revealed that, for the success of collective action, other than just handing over
management of CPR resources to communities, it is important to consider factors such as the
average age of household heads, distance of households from the nearest edge of the forest, the
institutional quality (i.e., level of institutional organization in terms of implementation of Ostrom’s
design principles), salience of the resource (level of dependence on the resource), number of house-
holds within a CFA jurisdiction (group size), proportion of males on the executive committee,
level of interaction with the various government departments in terms of frequency of meetings,
intensity of social interaction, structure of the group and whether officials are selected competi-
tively/democratically. In terms of the link, we found that the higher the probability of households
actively participating in CFA activities, the higher the likelihood of success in collective action
activities. The results also suggest that CFAs are more likely to be successful in collective action
if they are initiated by the communities themselves, with frequent interactions with government
departments. Our PCA results also revealed that, in addition to the factors identified earlier,
communities are more likely to self-organize in the presence of incentives such as PELIS and when
the forest cover is low or when there is scarcity in the supply of forest ecosystem services. One evi-
dent point is the significantly large effect of institutional quality variables on measures of outcome
of collective action. This shows that the principle of collective action within the Mau is key for
better ecological outcomes. We also noted that, whether we use the outcome of collective action
25We used Linear Probability Model (LPM) with robust standard errors rather than a logit or probit model on the dummy variable for
success of collective action. Due to unboundedness of the predicted probabilities that may lead to inconsistent and biased estimates, we
followed the approach of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) by estimating and assessing the predicted probabilities outside the unit interval.
We found that the predicted probabilities outside the unit interval were less than 30%, hence the LPM would still provide reliable
estimates in this case.
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or just a measure of collective action activity or cooperation, we would still arrive at very similar
conclusions.
A number of policy recommendations can be made from the study. First, although devolution
of forest management has the potential to increase efficiency and equity, it may not be an end
in itself in terms of achieving sustainability of CFAs as well as conservation of forests. Foresters
therefore need to understand the needs of households under their CFAs to effectively promote the
objectives of PFM. A more robust diagnostic approach in devolution of forest management to local
communities, considering diverse socio-economic and ecological settings, is therefore necessary.
Secondly, there is a need to revive and re-institutionalize existing CFAs in an effort to promote
PFM within the Mau forest and other parts of the country. Policy makers also need to promote
PFM in areas where, despite low forest cover, communities have been reluctant to adopt the
approach and explore other incentives and alternatives that can reduce over-reliance on forest
resources. Thirdly, intense efforts should be geared towards design of a mix of incentive schemes
to encourage active and equal household participation in CFA activities. In addition, public-
private partnerships could also play a role in strengthening and nurturing existing and infant
CFAs and creating awareness among locals. Lastly, to incentivize communities, the government
should explore ways of allocating land rights to forest-adjacent communities. In addition, KFS
should consider increasing the proportion of collected revenues that goes to CFAs and forest user
groups to support the local communities and CFAs financially as they find a way of handling
wayward foresters through constant interaction with community members.
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Appendix
Table 4: Summary statistics of variables used
variable N mean sd min max
ForestCover 518 76.85 19.15 2 97.97
Vandalism 518 22.63 25.57 0 120
CFAPartici n 518 0.625 0.484 0 1
Numbhsehlds 518 10081 19667 100 100000
GrpStructure 518 0.492 0.500 0 1
Natives 518 74.64 27.64 0 100
FBudget 518 299305 404142 0 1.500e+06
ECMale 518 6.836 3.880 2 18
VertInt 518 2.826 2.903 0 15
HorInt 518 4.396 6.834 0 22
GradChair 518 0.309 0.462 0 1
Competition1 518 0.759 0.428 0 1
SocInt 518 13.66 52.47 0.0350 251.0
MaritSta 518 0.863 0.344 0 1
MedAge 518 47.43 13.60 22 85
MedAgesq 518 2434 1460 484 7225
hhsize 518 5.678 2.579 1 16
Education 518 0.371 0.483 0 1
LivesVal 518 134294 343074 0 5.600e+06
Employment t 518 0.253 0.435 0 1
Woodlots 518 0.847 0.360 0 1
Hlandsize 518 2.334 5.148 0 90
LandTitle 518 0.523 0.500 0 1
DistForest 518 1.443 1.526 0 10
DistMroad 518 2.034 2.789 0 20
DistMarket 518 3.580 3.605 0 20
ResidStatus 518 0.546 0.498 0 1
MedIncome 518 15328 19238 2500 130000
IncentIndex 518 7.176 1.524 4 10
InstIndex 518 5.927 2.112 2 10
ImprIndex 518 3.678 1.532 0 6
DepIndex 518 16.35 2.617 9 21
Precipitat n 518 1170 181.2 937 1735
Temperature 518 15.04 1.726 12.20 18.20
Elevation1 518 2473 240.4 1858 2861
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Table 5: OLS regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ForestCover Vandalism IVforestcover IVVandalism PCA1
InstIndex 2.048* -0.460 1.949*** 0.984*** 0.0968***
(1.014) (1.364) (0.259) (0.309) (0.0264)
FBudget 1.73e-05** -2.13e-05** 1.48e-05*** -5.09e-06* 4.26e-08
(7.29e-06) (9.03e-06) (2.17e-06) (2.85e-06) (2.42e-07)
MedAge -0.262** 0.370** -0.298*** 0.394*** 0.00224
(0.113) (0.140) (0.111) (0.122) (0.00254)
MedAgesq 0.00206** -0.00269** 0.00238** -0.00312*** -2.41e-05
(0.000937) (0.00109) (0.00105) (0.00115) (2.00e-05)
Natives 0.000743 -0.819*** -0.0366 -0.710*** -0.00247
(0.0739) (0.115) (0.0282) (0.0458) (0.00231)
Numbhsehlds -0.000394** 0.000222 -0.000527*** 0.000457*** -1.00e-05*
(0.000142) (0.000164) (5.66e-05) (7.32e-05) (5.29e-06)
DepIndex -2.405*** 2.545*** -2.231*** 3.738*** -0.0157
(0.698) (0.650) (0.360) (0.268) (0.0370)
ECMale 1.166 0.122 1.178*** 1.710*** -0.0161
(0.692) (0.961) (0.282) (0.383) (0.0228)
CFAPart_Ht 3.559** -4.966** 3.377* -3.441* 0.139
(1.519) (2.027) (1.796) (1.873) (0.0844)
MedIncome -2.65e-05 -4.40e-06 -2.98e-05*** 3.26e-05** 5.98e-07
(1.96e-05) (2.20e-05) (1.06e-05) (1.64e-05) (6.42e-07)
GradChair -7.735 -13.73* -11.04*** 1.351 -0.462***
(4.721) (7.931) (1.711) (3.130) (0.102)
DistForest -0.529* 0.639** -0.494*** 0.501*** -0.0108
(0.269) (0.251) (0.157) (0.183) (0.00662)
Init_NGO 10.77 4.046 10.83*** 10.19***
(6.804) (11.47) (1.647) (3.572)
Init_RegGov -14.17** 49.71*** -13.88*** 57.97***
(6.386) (7.353) (2.120) (2.282)
Init_NatGov -19.53*** 14.37 -19.23*** 3.253
(6.735) (8.992) (1.883) (2.392)
GrpStructure 13.14** -49.36*** 11.24*** -46.92***
(5.845) (9.063) (2.119) (2.104)
Competition1 3.327 -21.01** 4.570*** -31.33***
(4.525) (8.035) (1.317) (2.170)
SocInt 0.206*** -0.327*** 0.176*** -0.269***
(0.0291) (0.0597) (0.0167) (0.0179)
LandTitle 2.147** -1.875** 2.242*** -1.845***
(0.816) (0.694) (0.575) (0.682)
ImprIndex 3.855** -24.69*** 2.133** -18.71***
(1.815) (2.604) (0.929) (1.278)
VertInt 1.057* -1.365*** 0.0953*
(0.592) (0.523) (0.0504)






Constant 279.1*** -504.6*** 259.3*** -579.5*** -0.795
(50.44) (94.61) (28.19) (28.50) (1.391)
Other Controls
Climate & Geographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset Holdings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 518 518 518 518 518
R-squared 0.895 0.907 0.897 0.923 0.830
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Major sources of Income within CFAs
Source of Income Percent Cumulative
Farming 60.81 60.81
Livestock Keeping 30.50 91.31
Bee Keeping 3.86 95.17
Tree Nursery 4.83 100.00
Table 7: Major sources of finance for the CFA
Sources of Finance N mean sd min max
Voluntary Contribution 518 0.286 0.452 0 1
Membership Fee 518 1 0 1 1
Payments for labour input 518 0 0 0 0
Fines 518 0.0888 0.285 0 1
Development agency 518 0.129 0.336 0 1
National/Regional govt 518 0.0483 0.215 0 1
Forest product sales 518 0.317 0.466 0 1
Own taxes 518 0 0 0 0
Special levies 518 0.0483 0.215 0 1
Aid from External NGO 518 0.330 0.471 0 1
Aid from Indigenous NGO 518 0.0637 0.244 0 1
Aid from Foreign govt 518 0 0 0 0
Table 8: Mode of communication to CFA members
Mode N mean sd min max
Letters 518 0.290 0.454 0 1
Schools 518 0.141 0.348 0 1
Vilhead 518 0.403 0.491 0 1
Cellphone 518 0.847 0.360 0 1
Mouth 518 0.707 0.456 0 1
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Table 9: Scale of dependence on forest resources
Scale of Dependence (%)
Resource Not dependent Slightly dependent Moderately dependent Very dependent
Wood fuel 4.83 0 22.78 72.39
Timber 95.17 4.83 0 0
Bee keeping 8.69 31.47 33.78 26.06
Herbs 5.02 41.12 30.89 22.97
Thatching 46.14 21.24 25.87 6.76
Fish farming 0 79.15 10.04 10.81
Water 3.09 4.83 5.02 87.07
Grazing 0 3.86 0 96.14
Poles harvesting 63.51 18.15 18.34 0
PELIS 23.36 4.83 8.11 63.71
Tree Nursery 92.28 2.90 0 4.83
Quarrying 92.28 7.72 0 0
Cultural activties 87.07 2.90 0 10.04
Table 10: Existence of rules
Rules regarding N mean sd min max
Forest access 518 0.759 0.428 0 1
Fire Management 518 0.938 0.241 0 1
Logging/charcoal burning 518 0.900 0.301 0 1
Punishment 518 0.448 0.498 0 1
Conflict Resolution 518 0.562 0.497 0 1
Role of EC/GR 518 0.965 0.183 0 1
Sharing benefits 518 0.550 0.498 0 1
Role of traditional 518 0.355 0.479 0 1
Conservation areas 518 0.961 0.193 0 1
Table 11: Summary of forest improvement activities
Activity N mean sd min max
Pruning 518 0.745 0.436 0 1
Enrichment planting 518 0.871 0.336 0 1
Reseed 518 0.780 0.415 0 1
Weeding 518 0.813 0.390 0 1
Silviculture 518 0.720 0.449 0 1
Thinning 518 0.330 0.471 0 1
Water 518 0.290 0.454 0 1
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Table 12: Existing incentives within CFAs
Incentive N mean sd min max
PELIS 518 0.766 0.424 0 1
Grazing 518 0.932 0.251 0 1
Herbs 518 0.830 0.376 0 1
Fuel wood 518 0.952 0.215 0 1
Bee Keeping 518 0.909 0.288 0 1
Milling 518 0.143 0.350 0 1
Fodder 518 0.749 0.434 0 1
Thatching 518 0.459 0.499 0 1
Eco-tourism 518 0.309 0.462 0 1
Fish farming 518 0.156 0.364 0 1
Fetching Water 518 0.969 0.173 0 1
Table 13: Principal Components of Collective Action by CFAs
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3
Eigen Value 2.227 1.571 1.147
Proportion of total variance 31.8 22.5 16.4
PC Vector
Pruning 0.403 0.428 -0.224
Enrichment planting 0.177 0.041 0.723
Reseeding 0.464 -0.294 0.292
Weeding 0.431 0.275 0.310
Silviculture 0.461 -0.417 -0.279
Thinning 0.432 -0.047 -0.398
Water 0.073 0.690 -0.099
Table 14: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity
ForestCover Vandalism
InstIndex_res1 0 InstIndex_res2 0
F (1,491) 0.80 F (1,491) 78.77
Prob > F 0.3792 Prob > F 0.000
Table 15: Performance statistics of IV models
Test Forestcover Vandalism
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 182.080 182.080
Chi-sq(25) p-val 0.0000 0.0000
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 2084.697 2084.697
Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) 161.272 200.273
Chi-sq(24) p-val 0.0000 0.0000
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